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This thesis explores the interactions between Navy Program
Managers and the United States Congress. It describes the
amount
and type of interactions, end the formal organization in
the Navy
to deal with them.
Initial research was based on telephone and written surveys.
This was followed by extensive personal interviews with
Congressional
staff members, Congressmen, DOD civilians, Congressional
liaison
personnel, and Navy Program Managers.
Congressional expectations or norms for their interactions with
Program Managers are discussed-, as well as Congressional views
of
what actually occurs. The effects of the discrepancies between
Congressional expectations and Congressional images of how Program
Managers act are described. Finally, some recommendations
are made




II. STATEMENT Op PROBLEM - - 8
III. DESIGN OF INVESTIGATION 13
IV. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 19
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY
TO DEAL WITH CONGRESS 19
B. ACTUAL PROGRAM MANAGER-CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS 31
1. Form of Contacts 31
2. Preparation for Contacts 34
C. WHAT PROGRAM MANAGERS SHOULD BE DOING -
FROM A CONGRESSIONAL VIEWPOINT 38
1. Know Congress 39
2. Be Honest and Provide Information 41
3. Characteristics of Program Managers +- 42
4. Other Items 43
D. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF
PROGRAM MANAGERS AND REALITY - WITH POSSIBLE CAUSES 44
1. Know Congress 45
2. Be Honest and Provide Information 50
3. Characteristics of Program Managers 53
4. Other Items 56
5. Problems Within the Naval System for
Dealing with Congress 58

E. EFFECTS OF DISCREPANCIES — 61
1. Know Congress „-, , 61
2. Be Honest and Provide Information 63
3. Characteristics of Program Managers 64
4. Other Items 65
5. Net Effect 66
V. CONCLUSIONS 68
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS _ 72
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NAVY 72
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROGRAM MANAGER SYSTEM 73
APPENDIX A. PROGRAM OFFICES SOLICITED FOR INFORMATION 77
APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE ON PROGRAM MANAGER-CONGRESSIONAL 80
INTERACTIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST _' 86
FORM DD 1473 87

LIST OF FIGURES
1. Department of the Navy Organization Chart (Abridged) 21
2. Example of the Formal Information Flow Between Congress and
















Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
House Appropriations Committee
House Armed Services Committee
Office of the Comptroller, Appropriations Committee
Liaison Office
Office of Legislative Affairs
Naval Operations, Congressional and Policy Coordination
Branch
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Senate Appropriations Committee
Senate Armed Services Committee
Secretary of the Navy
Indicates that the abbreviations were originated by the authors
and are not known to be commonly accepted.

I. INTRODUCTION
It is necessary at the outset of this thesis effort to discuss
what we do not intend to accomplish. We do not, in any way, intend to
provide a check list for Navy Program Managers, their offices, or for
students studying to become Program Managers; nor do we claim to pre-
sent a cure-all for problems in current Navy-Congressional relation-
ships. It is true that at the beginning of this effort, some hope was
attached to the idea of creating such a check list. In the course of
the investigations which followed, it became evident to us that the
large numbers and variety of Navy Program Manager-Congressional inter-
actions prohibited the development of any simple check list to be used
on all, or even most, occasions.
What we hope the reader will gain from this thesis is an apprecia-
tion of the existing problems in this subject area. In addition, some
suggestions are offered for Navy Program Managers and others involved
in this area of Congressional interactions. These suggestions are
advanced not as instant cures to the problems, but as ideas to be
considered and discussed in the hopes that they will lead to an improve-
ment in the current turbulent Navy-Congressional relations. Further,
it is hoped that the information and facts which are presented will
provide future students and Navy Program Managers with a better under-
standing of what they are likely to encounter in the Program Manager
arena. It should be noted that while this thesis deals with Navy
Program Manager-Congressional interactions, many of the problems exist
throughout the entire spectrum of Navy-Congressional interactions.

1 1 . STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Initially our interest in Navy Program Manager-Congressional inter-
actions v/as sparked by the combination of several events. One was a
course entitled, "Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis", [Ref. 1]
which, among other things, presented some background on the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees and their methods of operation. In
addition, several Program Managers emphasized the excessive time devoted
to testimonies and briefings for Congress [Refs. 2, 3, and 4]. Finally,
several Navy programs had been under attack by Congress [Ref. 5] as
being too costly, poorly managed, and/or unnecessary. Some preliminary
research made it apparent that there was a large portion of the Navy
Program Manager's business about which little documented information
existed.
For the purposes of this research, it was first necessary to define
what was meant by a Program Manager. We decided to use the Navy's list
of designated, major Program Managers [Ref. 6]. In addition, where
clearly delineated, program-like offices could be discovered, they were
added to the official list. The final list of program offices solicited
for information is included in Appendix A.
The first question which had to be answered was to what extent, if
any, did these Navy Program Managers interact with Congress. Were
there only a few Program Managers interacting with Congress, or did
most have some dealings with Congress? If there were a significant
number of Navy Program Managers interacting with Congress, what form
did these interactions take? Were they in the form of appearances
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before Congressional committees, or the simple answering of verbal
queries and correspondence?
If there were a significant number of Navy Program Manager-
Congressional interactions, what procedures and/or guidelines had there
been established in the Navy to deal with these interactions? Was
there any formal organization to guide Program Managers or to give them
aid? Tf .such an organization existed, was it an intelligence gathering
organization to warn Program Managers of pitfalls and areas of Congres-
sional concern, or did it merely provide the contact point for Program
Manager-Congressional interactions?
Much work has been done concerning Congressional relations with
government agencies other than the Department of Defense (DOD). Some
of the best documentation is contained in works by Fenno [Ref. 7] and
Wildavsky [Ref. 8], two studies of appropriation's politics and proc-
esses. Among other things, they investigated House and Senate Appro-
priations Committees' interactions with non-DOD governmental agencies.
Unfortunately, little similar work has been done for DOD-Congressional
interactions. We hoped to determine what commonality existed between
DOD and non-DOD interactions with Congress. While the major objective
was a parochial one, that of examining Navy Program Manager-Congressional
interactions, a secondary objective was to take some initial steps toward
filling the void in the literature on DOD-Congressional interactions.
It must be noted that only Navy Program Manager-Congressional inter-
actions were investigated. We do not mean to imply that all DOD, or all
Navy, interactions with Congress are identical to those of the Navy
Program Managers. It was not possible, nor desirable, in the time avail-
able to investigate all of the DOD-Congressional or the Navy-Congressional
interactions. However, it can be pointed out that the Navy's procurement

share of the overall defense budget is significant. (For the purposes
of this thesis, procurement includes research, development, test and
evaluation (RDT&E) and the acquisition of weapons systems, which are
those activities in which Program Managers are involved.) As such, the
Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions reflect attitudes and
actions of a significant number of senior Naval officers. Thus, while
overall Navy-Congressional interactions v/ere not explored in depth,
those problems which occur between Navy Program Managers and Congress
are in many ways representative of total Navy-Congressional troubles.
We not only wanted to study the interactions themselves, but we also
wanted to investigate their effects on legislation and appropriations.
It was hypothesized that poor Interactions with Congress might lead to
the "stretching-out" of programs, decreased funding for programs, or the
curtailment of entire programs. Some grounds for this hypothesis are
found in Fenno [Ref. 7, pp. 321-343]. He suggests that Congress samples
to find "soft spots" or areas where programs are experiencing troubles,
that they attempt to determine the character of the administrator, aw
that they collect information on programs to place in the public recc J.
If any of these are to their disliking, Fenno suggests that cuts in t e
program may result. Of course, there are alternate explanations for
program cuts: Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky [Ref. 10] suggests that
simple decision rules are used by Congress to cut budget requests.
Kanter [Ref. 11] claims that for DOD components, Congress makes selected
cuts in order to effect national security policy. Jernberg [Ref. 12]
suggests that different appropriations subcommittees investigate agencies
Of an $80.9 billion defense budget for FY 1973, the Navy's share for
procurement and RDT&E was $11.7 billion. Out of a requested $85 billion
for FY 1974, the Navy is allotted $12 billion [Ref. 9].
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in different v/ays: Some look at programs, some look at administrators,
and some look at agency input data. V/e decided to investigate why Con-
gressional committees and their staffs thought they cut Navy programs.
It should be noted that our approach was the direct one of asking
Congressmen and their staffs their perceived reasons as opposed to the
indirect method of researching Congressional reports.
Finally, we wanted to investigate the effects of the Navy Program
Manager-Congressional interactions on the Navy and the Program Managers
themselves. Did Program Managers change the way they interacted due to
past experience? Did the Navy change its approach to Congressional
interactions? Did the Navy view its interactions with Congress in a
good or bad light?
In short, our objectives were to bring to light those interactions,
if any, between Program Managers and the Congress. We desired to find
the Congressional viewpoint of those interactions, what they thought
should occur as opposed to what they actually observed happening. Where
there were discrepancies, we hoped to discover their possible causes and
any effects they might have.
After a brief discussion in Section III of the research design for
obtaining information on topics of interest, Section IV will present
the results of the research. It will start with a description of the
Navy's organizational structure for dealing with Congress in IV. A. and
then in IV. B. discuss the actual contacts which our research revealed.
Section IV. C. will describe the Congressional viewpoint of what Program
Managers should be doing. The discrepancies between these Congressional
expectations and the Congressional perception of what actually occurs
will be presented in IV. D. along with a delineation of some possible
11

causes for the discrepancies. Section IV. E. will review the effects
of these discrepancies.
Finally, in Section V conclusions will be drawn and in Section VI
the authors will offer recommendations.
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III. DESIGN OF INVESTI GATION
Since there was so little documented information on DOD-Congressional
interactions, initial research and reading was conducted in material
related to non-DOD agencies [Refs. 7, 8, and 13]. Initially it was
decided to pursue Fenno's approach and investigate Navy Program Manager
interactions with the Appropriations Subcommittees. In order to inves-
tigate the question of the frequency of Navy Program Manager-Congressional
interactions, hearings for the past several years of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees were examined. Although there was some evidence
of Navy Program Manager interactions with the Appropriations Committees,
the volume of such documented 'Interactions was small. Later contact with
the Navy Office of the Comptroller, Appropriations Committee Liaison
Office (NavCompLia) , whose assignment is to assist Navy personnel in
their relationships with the Appropriations Committees, led to the con-
clusion that the research area must be broadened.
It was found through several phone calls to Navy Congres r ional Li, son
personnel that the dealings of the Navy with Congress concerning proc re-
ment revolved primarily around four committees, the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC), the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), the Senate
Appropriations Committee (SAC), and the House Appropriations Committee
2(HAC). Consequently it was decided to investigate interactions between
Navy Program Managers and those four committees. (Actually, where the
2
For justification of this assertion, see questionnaire results
[Appendix B] which are discussed later. Of interest here is that out




Appropriations Committees are concerned, the Navy and DOD deal almost
exclusively with the Defense Subcommittees of the HAC and the SAC, and
not with the full committees. It should be understood that when the
SAC and HAC are referred to, we actually mean the Defense Subcommittees
of these committees.)
Research then followed a classical pattern. A sample telephone
survey was made of six Navy Program Managers to determine what, if any,
interactions they had with Congress. The telephone interviews ranged
from fifteen to forty-five minutes in length with both authors on the
line simultaneously. Detailed notes were taken for later review.
These telephone interviews were also utilized to experiment with the
form of various questions for later use in the questionnaire and in the
personal interviews. Once it was established that there were at least
some Program Manager-Congressional interactions, a questionnaire was
sent to sixty-six Program Managers [Appendix B]. While waiting for the
return of the questionnaires, further interviews were conducted with
various people, both within and outside DOD, who had prior experience
with Congress. Further research included past studies of selected cases
of DOD-Congressional interactions such as The Admirals Lobby [Ref. 14]
and The Politics of Weapons Innovation [Ref. 15]. Background information
was gathered on the current members and staffs of the four committees
[Refs. 16 and 17].
Since there was so little documented information available, the
authors felt that information should be obtained, as much as possible,
from those most familiar with Navy Program Manager-Congressional inter-
actions. Thus, the major input into the thesis came from two weeks of
intensive interviews in the Washington, D. C. area. These interviews
were not of a random sample of Washington bureaucrats but were of people
14

intimately involved in Congressional -Program Manager interactions. Forty-
one people were interviewed in sessions which ranged from thirty minutes
to three hours. Some of the appointments for interviews were made in
advance by people at the Naval Postgraduate School who had contacts in
the budgeting arena, others were arranged by interviewees interested in
ensuring that the authors received sufficient detail in a specific area,
still others were set up by Navy Congressional Liaison personnel. Finally
the authors arranged some interviews themselves when there seemed to be a
logical need to investigate an area and contacts were not available.
The timing of the trip v/as carefully planned and turned out to be
ideal. The interviews took place in early January, 1973, before the
annual budget had been presented by the President. Many of the people
interviewed were awaiting the arrival of the budget and, therefore, had
time to talk in detail. Those interviewed included Navy Program Managers,
Navy Congressional Liaison personnel, DOD lawyers and personnel involved
in Navy budgeting activities. Perhaps more important, Congressmen, their
personal staffs, and the staff members of the Appropriations and Armed
Services Committees were interviewed. To ensure objectivity, we included
Congressional opponents as well as proponents of defense. The staffs
of the Appropriations Committees were covered more thoroughly than were
the Armed Services staffs.
To highlight different viewpoints, the authors interviewed partici-
pants in a specific event (a SASC staff member briefing) which the
authors also attended. These interviews were conducted separately to
obtain each participant's impressions and viewpoints of the briefings.
Those interviewed included the staff member, the Congressional Liaison
representative, the Program Manager, and some of those Navy personnel
assisting the Program Manager with his brief.
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It was felt that, due to the limitations of time and currently
available information, the authors should concentrate their attention
on those most directly involved in the Congressional -Program Manager
interactions. Those not interviewed, who might have had significant
insight into the subject interactions include personnel from the Office
of Management and Budget, civilian personnel from the office of SECNAV
and the various ASN's and senior Naval personnel other than Program
Managers or those in procurement billets such as appropriations' spon-
sors. Future researchers in this area might consider interviewing
these people.
Prior to an interview, the authors reviewed the interviewee's role
in Congressional-Program Manager interactions and, where available,
biographical material about him. From facts learned in previous research
and in interviews which might have already taken place, a series of ques-
tions were prepared which were tailored toward the individual interviewee,
Often the questions served only as guidelines, as most interviewees
needed to hear only our opening remarks and one or two questions, after
which they would talk freely about the interactions and problems they
observed. At. times, there was so much interest generated that single
interviews expanded into several sessions.
Both authors were present at all interviews and alternated taking
notes and asking questions. This ensured that a train of thought could
be pursued to completion without interruption or hesitation for writing.
It also prevented time being v/asted on idle conversation, since at least
one of the authors would usually sense when it was appropriate to change
the subject and ask a different question. After the interviews, the
authors recorded their impressions on a tape recorder 3nd compared notes
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and ideas to ensure that both agreed on the facts presented. This
helped ensure that facts were not misrepresented, omitted, or added as
might be the case with a single interviewer. The tapes were saved, and
later a written summary of each interview was prepared. Although these
summaries are not included in the thesis due to their sensitivity, they
are available for additional research through the authors, as is a list
of the interviewees.
There were over seventy-five hours spent interviewing various
participants in the Program Manager-Congressional interaction arena.
These include the interviews in the Washington area as well as those
conducted by telephone and in the Monterey area. Forty- five to fifty
hours of those interviews were conducted in Washington. Over one third
of the interviewees were Congressional personnel (Congressmen and staffs)
and another third were Navy liaison personnel. The remainder were DOD
civilians, Program Managers, and Deputy Program Managers.
It is the nature of such studies that the results depend on things
which are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. In such cases i
is the duty of the researchers to select those items that were common
to many interviews as the ones to be presented and examined closely.
A research methodology of this kind has been used many times in the past
by political scientists investigating the Congress [Pvefs. 7, 8, 18, and
19]. The philosophy of science issues associated with observation,
measurement, and explanation, along with their relationship to a research
methodology such as the one adopted here, is discussed in Churchman
[Ref. 20, Chap. 4].
The Washington research and interviews provided the major input to
this thesis. It should be noted, however, that the success of the trip
17

was dependent on long and careful preparation by the authors, as well
as careful cultivation of contacts provided by other people. Further,
the timing of the trip was critical. By the end of the two-week period
budget activity was increasing significantly. Many of those interviewed
would not have been available or had time for talks at any other time of
the year. It is unlikely that these people would be willing to discuss
this material frequently or with anyone who did not have the proper
recommendations. Research in the immediate future should probably eschew
the interview and instead combine currently available interview results
with secondary source material found in committee hearings and reports.
All of this is said not to discourage future research in this area, but
to suggest that the successful use of our methodology is dependent upon
extensive preparation, proper contacts set up by other sources, and no




I V . PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY TO DEAL WITH CONGRESS
To understand the organizational structure of that part of the Navy
that deals with Congress, it is first necessary to understand a small
part of the budget cycle and the powers of the committees involved.
Once the budget is submitted by the President to Congress, there are
two phases which the military portion must pass through in each house
of the Congress. As a result of legislation passed in 1959 [Ref. 21],
all money for defense procurement must first be authorized by an
authorization bill. This bill is written by the HASC and SASC and
reported out to their respective chambers for passage. Once a program
is authorized, the HAC and SAC can appropriate money for it in an
appropriations bill. It should be noted that the authorization bill
only places a ceiling limit on the amount of money to be spent in an
area; the appropriations bill may be for considerably less than this
amount. To paraphrase a frequently heard example: The authorization
bill is like a hunting license, but you can't shoot bear until the gun
has been appropriated. It should also be noted that the House and Senate
versions of the bills frequently differ. After passage by the House
and Senate, a compromise on the two authorization bills is agreed upon
by a joint committee of the two chambers; the same is true of the two
appropriations bills. Theoretically, the substantive committees
(i.e., Armed Services) are supposed to concentrate on programs and
their objectives while the Appropriations Committees are supposed to
concentrate on financial questions. While this distinction is not
19

always true in non-defense areas [Ref. 7], our interviews indicate that
it is reasonably accurate for defense.
There are two official contact points in the Navy for Congressional
relations. The first of these, the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA),
is charged by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) [Ref. 22] to be the
single point contact for Congress, with two exceptions, the HAC and the \/
SAC. These two committees conduct their business with the Office cf
the Comptroller of the Navy and deal largely through the Appropriations
Committee Liaison Office (NavCompLia). Navy Liaison personnel indicated
that the reason for this split is that the Appropriations Committees
have directed it. While the rest of Congress supposedly desires infor-
mation on programs or specific problems, the Appropriations Committees
want specific financial information. They desire to deal directly with
those in the Navy (and other components of DOD as well as non-DOD
agencies) who are responsible for the management of the finances. OLA
reports directly to SECNAV whereas the Office of the Comptroller reports
to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management, who
reports to SECNAV. (See Fig. 1 for an abbreviated organization chart
of the Navy indicating the relationship of these offices.)
Although the type of information which flows through each office
may be different, the pattern of flow as described by various inter-
viewees is the same. A request for information (as an example) might
come from one of the Appropriations Committees to NavCompLia or from one
of the Armed Services Committees to OLA. In both cases, the request is
then forwarded to Naval Operations, Congressional and Policy Coordination
Branch, (OP 906). OP 906 works for the Director of Navy Programming who
works for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). OP 906 decides who in
20

Fig. 1 (Part 1)
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the Navy would be most likely to have the requested information and for-
wards it to the designated office for staffing and research. If it is
an item that will eventually be answered by a Program Manager, it reaches
him by one of two paths. If OP 906 knows the Program Manager who should
respond, they might send the request directly to him. Otherwise, it is
forwarded to the Legislative Liaison Office in the particular Systems
Command Headquarters involved and then to the Program Manager. (See
Fig. 2 for a diagram of the information flow.) Once the information
is collected, it is passed up this same chain and reviewed at each step.
OP 906 is also responsible for determining whether the information pre-
sented should be cleared by any other parties. If so, they send it to
such parties for clearance of additional information before returning
it to OLA or NavCompLia. The types of items which might pass through
this chain (Fig. 2) are requests for information, requests for briefings
of committees or committee staff members (or individual Congressmen),
review and editing of hearings, records, and additional material of
interest to Congress.
The number and background of the personnel in these offices, at the
time of our research, is of interest. OLA had thirty-six nonclerical
personnel. While it was not certain that prior command of a military
unit is a requirement for the office, one individual in OLA stated that
he viewed it as a necessity for presenting the best image to Congress,
and the majority of the people we met in OLA who might have direct con-
tact with Congressional personnel had command experience. No other
formal requirement for assignment to OLA was discernible. NavCompLia
had two nonclerical personnel, and their only apparent prerequisite was
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personnel, and there was no apparent formal requirement (other than
their rank) for the billets. The individual Legislative Liaison Offices
ranged from one to four people and were, as nearly as could be determined,
staffed entirely by civilians. Their background was mixed, ranging from
prior legislative liaison work to having performed public affairs type
work previously.
Each of these offices mentioned have more duties than merely for-
warding information. While a detailed description is available else-
where [Ref. 22], pertinent functions as described in interviews of OLA
personnel are appropriate for discussion. Representatives of OLA attend
3
all hearings and briefings of Congressmen, their staffs, and Congres-
sional committees other than Appropriations. They prepare a summary of
such hearings or briefings and send a copy to SECNAV, ASN, CNO, VCNO
(Vice Chief of Naval Operations) and OP 906. These summaries include
a list of the attendees, a brief account of what transpired, a discussion
of central themes, and the OLA representative's impressions of any
problems. In addition, the OLA representatives may try to prepare the
witness/briefer by describing the room arrangement, describing the
people who will be present, and listing possible questions. The amount
of effort that goes into each of these preparations depends on the tempo
of activities, the seniority of the witness, the sensitivity of the
program, and the willingness of the witness to accept or seek help. Each
of these aspects will be discussed in turn.
At this time, there are three Commanders in OLA, all of whom the
authors interviewed extensively, who normally accompany witnesses to
3
The technical differences between hearings and briefings arc dis-
cussed in Section IV. B. 1. of this thesis.
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Congress, although there are others, generally more senior, within OLA,
who can assist when required. As the tempo of hearings and briefings
increases, it is not unusual for each of the three to have several
events to cover in a single day. When this occurs, almost all of their
effort is expended in attending the hearings/briefings and little effort
can be devoted to preparing witnesses.
As might be expected the seniority of a witness affects the amount
of attention he receives, but in an unexpected way. One might assume
that a senior witness might receive more assistance in his preparations.
Our interviews indicate, however, that it is generally assumed by OLA
that the more senior a witness is, the more opportunity he has had to
appear before Congress or its staffs at some time in his career. It is
also assumed (to some extent by OLA and often to a larger extent by
senior Naval officers interviewed) that prior experience with Congress
makes one aware of most problem areas. This is not to say that OLA
does not try to prepare the witness by giving him questions when known.
However, the more senior a witness, the less detailed these potential
questions are likely to be. OLA personnel volunteered that this was
due, to some extent, to the natural reluctance of junior Naval personnel
to appear to be giving detailed advice to senior officers who consider
themselves proficient in a given subject area.
The sensitivity and size of a program has a predictable effect on
the amount of pre-briefing a potential witness might receive. There are
several reasons for this: If a program is under close scrutiny by Con-
gress, the Navy tends to devote more attention to ensuring that the
witness is given all possible help. He is expected to prepare extensively
and must appear before several mock hearings/briefings. Also, since it
26

is usually a controversial program, there is more said about it in
Congress, by the people investigating it, and by the media. This fact
gives OLA more clues with which to work and often they are able to
devise a more complete set of possible questions or points of Congres-
sional interest. Finally, a Program Manager who has a program that is
in trouble is more likely to seek information concerning areas of
Congressional interest from anyone who might have it.
The willingness of the witness to accept or seek help has, perhaps,
the greatest bearing on the amount and types of information received
from OLA. This is especially true in the case of Program Managers. In
the past, some Program Managers have refused OLA's offers of assistance.
As a result, those interviewed in OLA indicated that they seldom offered
unsolicited information to Program Managers.
There is a variety of information available through OLA for Program
Managers. Various branches collect information about the action and
attitudes of Congressmen and their staffs. Some of this information
is collected by listening to floor action, some by researching voting
records of individual Congressmen, some by the impressions and intell"
gence developed by listening to committee hearings and by accompanyin
staff members on trips. In addition, biographical and background data
is available on Congressmen and their staffs. All of this information
about the Armed Services Committees is available for use by Program
Managers who desire to tailor their presentation to fit the interests
and background of their audiences, and who wish to be aware of items
which have been of interest to the particular committee, Congressman,
or staff member in a recent time frame. Interviews with Program




NavCompLia has basically the same duties as the Congressional
Committees Liaison branch of OLA [Ref. 22], but our research indicates
that their method of operation is quite different. While potential
question areas provided by committee staff members are forwarded to
possible witnesses, and while NavCompLia personnel attend the hearings
and some of the briefings of the Appropriations Committees, their
intelligence gathering efforts are minimal compared to OLA or non-DOD
agencies. For example, as OLA does for the Armed Services Committees,
NavCompLia prepares a summary of Appropriations hearings; however, they
prepare no summaries of Appropriations briefings. Further, NavCompLia
has no personnel to collect or maintain biographical material. (As
mentioned before, NavCompLia had two functional personnel as opposed to
approximately thirty-six in OLA). Whatever intelligence is gathered
concerning individuals and trends appears to be on a somewhat haphazard,
unorganized basis.
As previously discussed, OP 906 coordinates Congressional inquiries
within the Navy. In interviews they told us that they are charged with
ensuring that answers to questions and other information forwarded to
Congress and its staffs reflect current Navy policies. They are also
responsible for ensuring that replies given to various groups are con-
sistent with other replies and with previous positions taken by the Navy,
They review testimony for consistency and inform CNO of what information
is flowing to the Congress. (It must be remembered that OLA and
NavCompLia work for SECNAV and do not report directly to CNO.) Further-
more, they are responsible for providing "point papers" and position
papers for CNO on pertinent items of interest, and they serve as his
personal back-up men when he appears before the committees of Congress.
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This combination of duties has a predicted effect, especially with only
five people in the office. It is the character of the current CNO to
be an activist, and he requires extensive staff v/ork for Congressional
relations. Since OP 906 is the central clearing house for this infor-
mation, they appear to concentrate their efforts on satisfying the CNO.
An effect of this as viewed by other officers in the system is that
there is insufficient time for OP 906 to follow up on all requests for
information and for policy coordination. This is seen as necessitating
a second, or even a third, Congressional request.
The Congressional Liaison offices within the Systems Command Head-
quarters are the final link in the liaison chain. As previously men-
tioned, they are frequently by-passed. Much of their v/ork involves
answering, or ensuring that someone answers, the technical questions
posed by Congress. They have the specialized knowledge of the matrix ^
form of management of the individual Systems Commands which enables them
to identify the individual to task for a specific answer. They also
have a working knowledge of Congress, and sometimes substitute for the
SECNAV OLA personnel at briefings and hearings as required. Many of
the Systems Commands liaison personnel are long-tenured civilians. While
they don't have as much direct contact with the Congress as the SECNAV
OLA personnel, their long exposure to Congress often appears to give
them a sense of history about the Congressional process which does not
exist in any other part of the Navy Liaison system. They are manpower
limited and don't have readily available the extensive information that
the SECNAV OLA possesses. However, the liaison personnel indicated they
can obtain most of this information from SECNAV OLA. A Program Manager




Now that the Navy structure for Program Manager-Congressional
interactions has been described, the results of our investigations into
the frequency and types of these interactions will be discussed.
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B. ACTUAL PROGRAM MANAGER-CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS
1 . Form of Contacts
Sixty-six questionnaires were sent to Program Managers; fifty
responses were received. (See Appendix B.) It is noteworthy that of
the fifty replies, forty-two indicated some dealings with Congress, many
of which were quite extensive and repetitive. These interactions fall
into four categories: hearings, briefings of Congressmen and/or
Congressional committees, briefings of committee staff members, and
responding to questions of Congress and staffs.
Hearings are formal sessions where the Congressional committee
members question witnesses about specific items, general items, or
both. These questions and their answers are recorded and published in
hearing's books (with security deletions). These sessions satisfy
several purposes. They are both for gathering information and placing
it in the public record. They are used by the Chairman as a means to
inform and to train junior members, and they serve as a method for the
Congress to deliver its wishes to agency personnel. Presentations
tend to be somewhat formal, are generally not conducted in great depth
(although there are numerous exceptions), and are often done by senior
Naval officers [Ref. 23]. In-depth interviews indicate that with the
exception of controversial, large dollar programs, Program Managers
generally act only as back-up witnesses. Although the answers to the
question about the preparation for hearings (question one of Question-
naire in Appendix B) lead one to believe that many Program Managers
participate in hearings, further investigation revealed that this was
due to a poor choice of words in the question. Actually a large number
of Program Managers (thirty-three of the fifty who replied) must prepare
as potential back-up witnesses, but some that prepare do not appear for
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the actual hearings, and few actually testify. It is not unusual for
a Program Manager to appear as a back-up witness for a senior officer
(usually an Appropriations sponsor) and never be called upon to testify.
Briefings of Congressmen fall into two classes: The first is
the briefing of an individual Congressman (or a group of them) who
simply wants to be informed about a specific area. The second is the
briefing of a committee or some portion of a committee. The latter
is usually conducted as a form of pre-hearing research on the part of
the committee. They often investigate areas more deeply than in
hearings and may frequently be looking for areas that they want to
place in the public record. Program Managers frequently become involved
in briefings, especially before the Armed Services Committees. Of the
fifty responding Program Managers, thirty-two had to brief at least one
committee or subcommittee one time, twenty-five had been involved in
more than one Congressional briefing. Twenty-seven had appeared before
the SASC or one of its subcommittees; thirteen had appeared before SAC
(subcommittee on Defense). The difference between the numbers of those
Program Managers briefing ASC and Appropriations Committees is probably
due to the different outlook of the committees. It must be remembered
that the Appropriations Committees tend to look at line items whereas the
Armed Services Committees look at program items.
Program Managers are frequently involved in the briefings of
committee staff members. Question seven of the questionnaire asked
about Program Manager briefings of staff members only as a part of all
contacts with staff members, so the numbers are not conclusive; however,




Since Congressmen have many obligations other than their
committee work, they often can not study programs and budget requests
in any great detail. Consequently they depend, to a large extent, on
their committee staffs to perform this detailed work. Interviews
indicate that more Program Managers brief staff members than Congress-
men or than appear at hearings. Staff members spend most of their time
keeping current on programs in their specialty areas (especially specific
problem areas). Those interviewed were frequently knowledgeable about
even minor technical details of programs. Staff briefings are generally
informally conducted affairs where Program Managers update the history
of their program, and staff members ask questions. Staff members
indicated that they are generally Searching for problem areas which
might require cuts in the budget request, or very occasionally, areas
where they feel DOD has not requested sufficient funding. They want to
provide questions for their committee members in the areas where they
know interest exists or where they feel interest should exist. Thus,
it would appear that the briefings of the staff by a Program Manager
could have a significant effect on the program.
The final form of contact between Program Managers and Congre< .
is the response by Program Managers to requests for information. These
requests usually originate from one of three sources. The first is a
request from committee staff members for detailed information, either
because a briefing didn't include the desired information, or because
of some recent change in the program. The second is for information to
be supplied to the formal hearing record which was not available during
the actual hearing. The third is the request for the answer to a specific
question or problem from a Congressman, usually referred to as a constitu-
ent problem. This may take the form of questions like, "Why didn't
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Company XYZ of my state receive the contract for System A?" Most re-
quests of these types flow through the OLA (or NavCompLia) and OP 906
system. Occasionally a Congressman or staff member will call directly
for information in which case the Program Manager must decide whether
to answer directly or stall for time and send the answer through official
channels. It should be noted that if the answer is given directly, it is
the responsibility of the Program Manager to inform OLA or NavCompLia,
in writing, of what transpired [Ref. 24].
The questionnaire results indicated that many Program Managers
have one or more of these interactions (hearings, briefings of commit-
tees, briefings of staffs, and responses to requests for information)
at least annually, and fifteen of the fifty described the formal contacts
as occurring more frequently. Eight Program Managers indicated that
they had experienced no Congressional interactions. Several indicated
that this might be attributed to the fact that they had been a Program
Manager for only a short period of time. Further investigation revealed
that the number, frequency, and timing of these interactions are depen-
dent on the phase of the budget cycle, the extent of unfavorable publicity,
the impression the presenter made the previous year, program size, pro-
gram cost, and the amount of past committee interest, especially
unfavorable.
Having described the actual Program Manager-Congressional





The questionnaire results (questions three and six), combined
with interviews of Program Managers, show that there are mixed feelings
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by program Managers on how to prepare for testimonies/briefings. The
split was about even on whether they thought one should concentrate on
the technical aspects of the program or on both technical aspects and
techniques of presentation. Interviews with Program Managers and other
Navy personnel who did not feel techniques were important revealed a
common feeling: Most Naval officers, especially senior officers, can
speak well on a topic about which they are knowledgeable. They also
felt that since Program Managers are, or should be, completely knowl-
edgeable about their program, there is little need to worry about the
quality of their presentations. Those who were concerned with techniques
emphasized the need for presentation aids (movies and slides) rather than
other techniques, such as changing the manner and form of presentation to
appeal to the backgrounds and interests of the Congressional audience.
All Program Managers felt that technical knowledge of their pro-
gram was important, and all (except the new Program Managers) felt they
had a good grasp of the problems within their program and of the tech-
nical details. Most of those interviewed had a standard presentation
which they updated as new information became available. Although the
Program Manager's time is largely consumed by the management of his
program, the manager of a large and/or controversial program normally
must conduct numerous briefings which include some or all of the follow-
ing: The appropriations sponsors, DOD personnel, SECNAV personnel,
military and non-military activities, and finally, Congressional commit-
tees and staff members. After a few of these presentations, the briefing
follows a standard format. There was evidence that some Program Managers
believed that Congressional briefings were just one more of many, and
that having successfully conducted the multitude of briefs in the DOD
arena, there was no reason to especially worry about Congress.
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There are specific steps taken by some Program Managers in
preparation for Congressional appearances as discussed in a speech by
a senior Naval Procurement Officer [Ref. 4]. If our interviews are
representative, few Program Managers perform all of the items which
follow; many do none of them. Some prepare by studying the prior year's
records of hearings and reports. They determine what types of questions
were asked and, for their program, what answers were given. They search
for trends. A few Program Managers reported that they ask others who
have testified/briefed recently the types of questions being asked.
Some have personal contacts on the committee staff who will let them
know of potential question areas. Program Managers will occasionally
ask OLA (or NavCompLia) to find out what questions are likely to be
asked. Other Program Managers have a mock hearing/briefing with their
staff and require the staff members to ask difficult questions.
In addition to all of the foregoing, most Program Managers of
major programs must go through a "murder board" which is a presentation
of the potential Congressional brief before senior personnel from eit ?r
the Systems Command involved or from OPNAV. The members of + ne board
are supposed to ensure that the witness is well prepared. OLA (or
NavCompLia) personnel are frequently on the board and can critique the
presentation from the Congressional viewpoint. Many Program Managers
4
Committee reports are summaries of hearings with recommendations
and sometimes back-up material that are released by committees at the
completion of hearings when they make their recommendations to the
chamber. Since a bill may be very short (especially an Appropriations
bill), it is often necessary to read the committee report to determine
the intent of the committee in the making of a law. Reports have the
force of law and are used by the Government Accounting Office when
interpreting the intent of a bill or resolving ambiguity. They further
serve to highlight specific areas of committee interest.
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who had been before these boards
indicated, however, that the boards ^
provided little assistance to then in
preparing for Congress. It
appeared to some that the only accomplishment
of the board was to pro-
vide a means for updating others on
their program.
As mentioned before, a few Program Managers
indicated that they
prepared for Congressional interactions by
researching the backgrounds
and interests of the people before whom
they were going to speak; most
interviewed did not. Those who didn't stated
that they felt it was
unimportant to tailor a presentation to fit an
audience. Of those who
indicated that they would change their
presentation to fit a group, but
would not study backgrounds of the group,
most said that they depended
on questions from the audience to guide
them as to how to tailor their
presentations. Some Program Managers mentioned
that they would use
background information if it were readily available,
but that they did
not think it was. Few showed any knowledge
of the material available
in OLA or in commonly available publications
such as the Congressional
Directory [Ref. 16]. The idea of having a common
presentation for all
four of the Congressional committees is
further fostered by Navy
instructions: "There' should be common preparation
for appearances
before the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees or their
respective Subcommittees." [Ref. 22, p. 3.
J
As mentioned in Section IV. A., there are few
pre-briefing
services given to the Program Managers by OLA or
NavCompLia. The
reasons given for this fact were the lack of time
on the part of all
concerned, the feeling of OLA and NavCompLia that
their services are
not desired by Program Managers, and the feeling
on the part of Program
Managers that OLA and NavCompLia have little useful
information. Some
stories were told of pre-briefings occurring in a
car on the way to the
briefing.

There is one type of Program Manager-Congressional interaction
for which there can be little preparation. This is the sudden request
for information, either through the OLA(NavCompLia)-OP 90G chain or
over the telephone from some Congressman, or his staff member. Accord-
ing to several Program Managers, the best preparation for this type of
interaction is to be totally knowledgeable of your program at all times.
There are two ways Program Managers can respond to these types of
requests; either by passing a written or verbal answer through the
official hierarchy or by responding immediately by telephone. Each
Program Manager seemed to have his own approach, but those who more
frequently answered by telephone emphasized that the official channels
could take a week or more to forward information to Congress and many
felt that events moved too fast in their programs to permit such a
delay. However, the officially correct method is to respond in writing
[Ref. 25].
. Sections IV. A. and IV. B. have discussed the organization of
the Navy for dealing with Congress, the interactions which actually
occur, and Program Manager preparations for those interactions. In
Sections IV. C. and IV. D. we will discuss the Congressional views of
what Program Managers should be doing in their Congressional interactions
and what they view Program Managers actually doing.
C. WHAT PROGRAM MANAGERS SHOULD BE DOING - FROM A CONGRESSIONAL VIEWPOINT
The following descriptions of Congressional expectations of Program
Managers are gleaned from the interviews with Congressmen, their personal
and committee staffs, and a few civilians in DOD who have been successful
participants in the overall military-Congressional interactions for a
number of years. These expectations can be applied, to a large extent,
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to any Navy witness. In
fact, some of the ideas presented
will apply
more to the Navy as a whole
than to Program Managers. It is
of interest
that most of these expectations
follow in the tradition of the
literature
on Appropriations Committees
[Refs. 7, 8, and 13].
1 . Know Congres s
Congress looks upon itself as one of
the most important bodies
of government in the world.
Our research, as well as others
[Refs. 7
and 8], indicates that Congressmen
feel that it behooves people appearing
before them to understand the way
they operate. They have certain tradi-
tions and customs, and they feel that
potential witnesses should be aware
of them. The following are specific
items related to the expectations
that a Program Manager and the Navy
in general should know the Congress.
With respect to Program Managers,
there are a number of differ-
ences in the way the four primary
committees work and view their roles.
For instance, in recent years the
SASC has become quite expert in
weaponry and individual weapons systems.
Research indicates that members
see themselves as trying to force
economies on the services and feel fat
one way to accomplish this is by cutting
programs which are not needec
The Appropriations Committees, especially
in the House, look more at ! m
the dollars are managed than at the need
for a program. Staff members
state that these committees expect Program
Managers to be aware of
these differences in their interests and
to present information accord-
ingly. They expect the information to
be presented in a form with which
they are familiar and at a technical level
that they can comprehend.
They also expect the Program Manager to
recognize the intelligence of
the committee members, many of whom have




A consistent comment from Congressmen and their staffs was that
Congressmen expect Program Managers to recognize the demands placed on
their time: demands of getting re-elected, answering constituent prob-
lems, serving on other committees, and many other duties. These demands
serve to ensure that there is never enough time in the day for a
Congressman to devote adequate attention to urgent committee matters
5
and to understand all the aspects of a problem. As a result, Congress-
men consciously depend on their personal staffs and, to a greater extent,
on the committee staffs, to be experts in the specific subcommittee
fields.
Committee staff members are expected to prepare the questions
for the Congressmen on sensitive and important areas. Although there
are exceptions, and staff members state that Congressmen have methods
of ensuring that the desired items are selected; by and large,
Congressmen leave the selection of items for investigation to the staff
members. This means the staff member must be the one who investigates
problems in great detail. As a result, staff members state that they
desire the current program information in order that they, in turn, can
indicate areas of interest and provide questions to their committee
members. Because of the expertise developed by this research, staff
members often help in the writing of the final bill and report [Ref. 13].
The point is, Congress expects Program Managers, and the Navy, to
recognize the importance of committee staffs and to cooperate fully with
them.
Another consistently mentioned expectation of Congress is that
Program Managers listen to the signals, or hints, which are given. In the
5
For further discussion of the problem of multiple demands on a
Congressman's time, see Ref. 26.
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hearings and briefings Congressmen and staffs often express opinions of
how things should be accomplished and what should be done in specific
areas. Further more explicit signals might be given in the report
which accompanies each bill. While recognizing that not all suggestions
should be followed and that some suggestions may be naive, Congressmen
expect most of their suggestions to be considered and generally adhered
to. Many times these suggestions involve overall Navy policy over which
the Program Manager has no control; in which case the Congress expects
the Navy to take heed. This is especially true when the interest or
concern of a committee is expressed repeatedly, year after year. Even
though the Program Manager has little control over Navy policy, non-
compliance with Congressional wishes by the Navy can affect his program
as will be discussed later.
2. Re Honest and Provide Information
The comment that Program Managers and other witnesses should be
honest was made so often and by so many people, both on the Congressional
side and the military side, as to appear trite. The Navy even mentions
it in its general publication for witnesses [Ref. 23]. However, there
is more involved in being "honest," as Congress sees it, than just
answering a question truthfully. As one staff member explained it,
Congressmen and their staffs will unintentionally ask a question in
such a manner that it can be answered without revealing anything, but
if it were phrased slightly differently, the answer would reveal
In our opinion this publication deserves far more credit than
it seems to receive. When read carefully, it provides an informative
description of hearings, briefings, the authorization-appropriations
process, and general guidelines for witnesses. Some of the guidelines




considerable information of interest to the committee. This may be due
to the Congressmen not having the technical background to phrase the
question to obtain the information desired. Congressmen realize that
they need information both for themselves and for the record, and they
hope that the answers provided will include adequate material to cover
the general subject area. Thus, they would prefer that the witness
answer what one DOD official referred to as the "real question" that is
being asked. They don't want to be given answers that skirt the issue
or that are strictly uninformed and exaggerated talk. If a Program
Manager doesn't know the answer, they expect to be told that fact.
Congressional personnel stated that they expect to be given cor-
rect information promptly when it is requested. Although staff members claim
they generally do not request a specific witness from DOD, preferring rather
to request a particular briefing and to let DOD pick the witness, they gen-
erally indicated that it is preferable to talk to the man in the Navy who is
most knowledgeable on a topic. In the case of programs most felt this should
be the Program Manager.
Congress further expects information to be consistent from 3 ar to
year. Staff members stated that one of the methods which Congress ses as
an indicator of program troubles is inconsistent answers, both within a
single year and from one year to the next.
3. Characteristics of Program Managers
Interviews indicated that Congress expects much the same of a
Program Manager that other researchers suggest the HAC expects of any
agency administrator [Ref. 7]. They expect him to be totally knowledge-
able of his program and of all its facets. They expect him to be an
efficient administrator. A consistent statement was that he should be
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willing to admit mistakes when they have occurred rather than trying to
defend actions which led to the mistake. They expect to find in the
Program Manager someone they can trust to administer the millions of
dollars being given his program.
As part of being knowledgeable about his program, they often
expect a Program Manager to know how his program compares to similar
programs (as the F-14 versus the F-15) and how it affects, or is
affected, by other programs. For instance, if it is a missile that
is being designed to be placed aboard a new class of ships, what will
happen to his program if the building of those ships is delayed? This
expectation was voiced more by Armed Services personnel than by Appro-
priations personnel. He must be aware of, and able to answer, criticisms
which may be raised by various critics within and without the military.
SASC personnel stated that he must convince Congress of his ability to
manage the program as well as the need for the program and for the
requested amounts of funding.
4. Other Items
The interviews revealed some items that applied more to the Navy
as a whole than to Program Managers. The first of these is the habit of
bringing problems to Congress for solution. Some Congressmen stated that
Congress would prefer the military to not force it to decide between
similar or substitutive programs; they believe this should be done
within DOD.
Another item which surfaced primarily from discussions with DOD
and non-DOD civilian budgetary experts v/as the concept of having
"something to give up." According to these experts this requires
recognition of the fact that staff members and Congressmen feel it is
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important to cut waste out of the budget. A ploy used by other agencies
is to have items in the budget that they fully expect to be cut so that
other, truly necessary, Items will be passed without reduction in funding
or fundamental changes. One staff member referred to this process as
"Chinese arithmetic"--which requires study to see what is actually
happening. He mentioned the fact that often money is cut out of one
program, and the fact publicized, only to be given without fanfare to
some other program. Thus, the committee and the staff members have
received the needed publicity, and yet the agency receives its money.
A final item concerns the rotation and generalist (jack-of-all-
trades) policies of the Navy. The opinion was repeatedly expressed by
Congressmen and their staffs that allowing a good Program Manager to
remain in his job would aid in the building of trust. The Appropria-
tions Committee personnel also would like to see a career pattern in
financial management.
D. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF PROGRAM
MANAGERS AND REALITY—WITH POSSIBLE CAUSES
This part describes the existing differences between Congressional
expectations of Program Managers and what actually happens. These
differences were gleaned from the interviews and include both those
viewed by Congress and Program Managers as well as those which are
perceived only by Congress.
After each statement of a difference between expectations and
perceived reality, the authors will discuss some possible causes for
these discrepancies. These possible causes include some suggested by
Congressional personnel, some advanced by DOD civilians, and some
offered by Navy personnel—Program Managers and Liaison Personnel. In
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addition, the authors have, in some cases, offered their own hypotheses
of possible causes. While the discrepancies in fact are seen to exist
by Congressmen and their staffs, as well as other participants in the
Program Manager-Congressional interactions, the possible causes are
offered for consideration and as ideas for further research.
1 . Know Congress
Both staff members and DOD budgetary personnel stated that the
average Program Manager has very little detailed understanding of
Congress and the way it operates. They frequently remarked on the
lengthy time period required by a Program Manager to understand the
ways of Congress. This may not seem surprising when one considers the
role of Congress in a Naval Officer's life prior to his becoming a
Program Manager. In all likelihood, he has studied Congress in a high
school civics course and possibly in a college-level political science
course. Since then the Program Manager has been acquiring the technical
competence and operational experience that led to his becoming a Program
Manager. Since the average Naval Officer has an aversion to "politic:
[Ref. 14, p. 9], he has probably avoided studying the political mecha i-
zations of Congress. Few Naval Officers have served in a billet that
dealt directly with Congress.
Appropriations staff members strongly emphasized that most
Program Managers don't understand the real differences between the
Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees. This is
not to say they don't understand the authorization-appropriation
process, which they do. But few are aware of the differences in history
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of the committees or of the differences in the committee outlook and
interests. Most Program Managers interviewed felt that one committee
was no different from another, just that some showed more interest in
their program. As discussed earlier, the Navy system appears to promote
similar treatment of all committees by directing witnesses to have
common preparation for the different committees [Ref. 22, p. 3]. One
could argue that the consistency expectation of Congress demands common
preparation. However, it is not necessarily inconsistent to present
information on the same program in two different forms, thus allowing
the individual interests of the committee to be met without excessive
questioning on their part. OLA representatives pointed out that the
parts of the Navy which should be most capable of outlining the differ-
ences of the various committees (OLA and NavCompLia) are separated from
each other. Both NavCompLia and OLA personnel appear to feel that this
physical separation contributes to a lack of understanding of the com-
mittee differences.
Although Program Managers are provided the general areas of
interest that should be discussed at a briefing/hearing, most of the
Congressional personnel interviewed felt that Program Managers did not
give the information desired by them in a manner which could be easily
comprehended. A large portion of this was seen by them as being due to
a failure on the part of the Navy to listen to the signals of Congress
and act accordingly. Some DOD civilian personnel pointed out that the
Even OLA and NavCompLia personnel indicated that, as far as they
knew, the authorization-appropriation process had existed in its present
form since there had been an Armed Services Committee. As pointed out




technical nature of a Program Manager's background almost certainly
ensures that without adequate guidance, his briefs will tend toward
the technical aspects of his program. Even though he purposely makes
his briefs clear and simple, staff members stated that the meetings
were often a waste of their time as information covered was not that
which was desired.
A possible cause for the communications breakdown may be seen
in the fact that OLA frequently does not give Program Managers a thor-
ough brief prior to hearings/briefings unless specifically requested
to do so. Conversely, many Program Managers stated that they feel a
Congressional briefing is just one of many they have conducted, and
it thus requires no special attention. A possible problem with such
thinking was emphasized by a prominent DOD civilian when he described
the briefings and adversary relationships within DOD as being friendly,
whereas those before Congress are deadly serious, and Congress should
be viewed as true adversaries. Thus, there does appear to exist a
situation where Program Managers may feel they need no pre-brief and
ordinarily, one is not voluntarily offered by OLA or NavCompLia. Staff
members volunteered that in these briefings it is quite possible for
Program Managers to say, or do, something wrong and not even be aware
of it until the program funding is cut. At that point, it is too late
to change.
Staff members indicated that Program Managers have at times
treated Congressmen as if they lacked the intelligence to understand their
presentation. In our research some Program Managers did in fact refer to
Congressmen as being cynical, ignorant, and illogical. The Congressional
reactions to technical briefs/hearings may contribute to the idea in
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Navy Program Manager's minds of an ignorant Congress. Non- technically
oriented people, grasping at technical problems, ask questions which
may seem meaningless to the technically oriented presenter. Frequently
the questions may seem to indicate a complete lack of understanding of
the problems concerned. Perhaps Program Managers view this as showing
a general lack of intelligence; this possibly leads to their derogatory
o
descriptions of Congress. While there is no hard evidence to prove
it, one must speculate that such contempt may be evident to some extent
in the presentations.
Congress expects Program Managers to appreciate the importance
of committee staffs to the overall committee system. Our investigation
and those of others [Refs. 7 and 8] indicate that staff members frequently
have a major input into hearings and the actual write-up of a bill and
report. This is due to their technical knowledge, tenure, and ability
to influence the questions. Our interviews revealed that staff members
feel that not all Program Managers appreciate the status and role of he
staff in Congress. As a result, staff members feel that information
passed to them often is incomplete, incorrect, or not well thought 01 ..
There was a case related to the authors of testimony being given in a
hearing, coupled with the claim by the presenter that the staff members
had been given the same information when, in fact, they had not. To
appreciate the effect such events had on staff members, it was only
necessary to hear the bitterness in their voices when they discussed it.
Finally, the Navy is viewed by practically all Congressional
personnel and DOD civilians interviewed as not listening to the signals
o
This is obviously a very difficult area to discuss in an interview.




from Congress nor following their expressed wishes. A possible partial
explanation of this is that it runs counter to Navy-DOD traditions. The
military tends to see itself as being in the best position to make
decisions on what they perceive as purely military decisions once the
funding is given to them [Ref. 14]. However, Congress frequently believes
that some military decisions have political implications. They feel that
they are best qualified to make these decisions [Ref. 27, p. 307]. When
these views conflict, the military is seen as frequently avoiding follow-
ing the wishes of Congress which run counter to the military wishes
until they are forced to by law.
A further explanation for this discrepancy between expectations
and reality may be that expressions and wishes of Congress about items
which a Program Manager controls may not even be known at the Program
Manager level. For example, some Program Managers were not aware of the
contents and nature of a committee report. Most who mentioned it
viewed it as an indication of the areas in their program which needed
"covering-up" rather than changing. Few were aware of the memory Con-
gress has and thus felt that if an item were mentioned one year it would
often be forgotten by the next year. If it wasn't mentioned the second
g
year, many considered the item a dead issue.
The sheer number of Congressional requests, both constituent and
Congress originated, is another factor advanced by OLA and OP 906
g
For an example of Congressional memory the reader is directed to
the record of the interest of HAC in proficiency flight pay. Interest
in this subject has existed sporadically since 1947, and the most recent
result was the law to cancel proficiency flight pay for senior officers
as of 1 July 1973.
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interviewees that helps strain Program Manager-Congressional relations.
Often the Program Manager is not sure whether a query is a routine
constituent one requiring only a perfunctory reply, or a personal one
from a Congressman or staff member requiring a detailed answer. He must
react in the same manner to all queries. It is conceivable that after
receiving a multitude of requests, a busy Program Manager might tend to
give lip service to all queries and not allocate adequate attention to
the pertinent ones, in which case requests received by the Program Manager
which have meaning and which could return to haunt a program and the Navy
would be lost in the plethora of requests which are made to satisfy
constituents.
2. Be Honest and Provide Information
Navy Program Managers are generally described by the Congressmen
and their staffs interviewed as being truthful and honest only in the
strictest sense of the word. As previously mentioned, the term honesty
means more in the Congress's mind than a formally correct answer to a
specific question. Here there was an almost universal condemnation of
Program Managers and of the Navy. Congressmen and their staffs interviewed
felt that Program Managers frequently were not telling the full truth, that
they avoided discussion of problem areas in their programs, and that they
avoided answering more than the specific question. Many Program Managers
seemed to agree with this and felt that this is what was expected of them
by the Navy.
One hypothesis suggested by the authors for this is the afore-
mentioned differing views the Congress and the Navy have of their own
and each others' roles. Although there are some in the Navy who view
the Congress as the final arbitrator in disputes over the distribution
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and use of resources [Ref. 15], most in the Navy see Congress only as a
body to authorize and appropriate money for programs designed to meet a
military threat [Ref. 14]. These latter individuals feel that it is the
Navy's responsibility, by law and training, to recognize and define said
threat and to design weapons to meet it. They also feel that the Con-
gress needs only enough information to ensure that the general programs
are necessary, not the detail needed to judge specific program needs or
management. Conversely, while Congressmen express a desire for the
military to solve their own problems, they see the Navy as the service
which is responsible for highly controversial and expensive programs,
such as the DD-963, F-14, CVAN-70, and others. They feel that there has
been mismanagement and that the Navy may be procuring systems which, even
if properly managed, are too expensive to meet the perceived threat
[Ref. 28]. Feeling thus, Congress wants considerably more information
than the Navy desires to provide, in order that they can make their own
judgments on the system need and the quality of management. This
conflict in perceived roles must often be resolved by a Program Mana 2r
who must decide whether to keep the Congress happy by givirg full ir or-
mation or to keep his Navy seniors happy by only giving that inform ;ion
which has been previously approved. The Program Manager reaction runs
the full gamut from almost full disclosure to passing only fully sani-
tized information. Most Program Managers seemed to be forced into some
middle position of trying to keep both groups satisfied.
Pressure, either implied or actual, from senior officers to
withhold unsanitized information is recognized by Congress. This was one
This problem is just one more form of the traditional constitu-
tional separation of powers problem.
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of the reasons suggested by Congressional staff members for the common
complaint of not being allowed to talk to the person that has the infor-
mation they need. For weapons systems they mentioned that the Program
Manager is frequently not the one sent to discuss a program even though
he has responsibility for the program. When the Program Manager does
appear, he is often accompanied by officers senior to him and allowed to
talk only about the technical aspects of his program. Whether it is true
or not, the Congressmen and their staffs perceive this entourage as
limiting the Program Manager in the information that he can give.
Appropriations staff members voiced the complaint of facing a "sea of
blue" (a room full of witnesses) when the Navy appears to testify or
brief. (One gets the impression that they feel cowed by the sheer num-
bers of witnesses, and they resent it.)
Complaints about the weight of the hierarchy between Program
Managers and Congress were voiced by Program Managers as well as the
Congress. Many Program Managers complained that one of their biggest
problems was having too many people willing and eager to speak for their
program— people with little specific knowledge of their program and who
often gave incomplete or incorrect information. Also, Program Managers
claimed they often have information which they know Congress desires and
they want to forward, but that the Navy hierarchy prevented any such
exchange. We witnessed one Program Manager have his briefing with a
committee staff member canceled for no announced reason. Upon investiga-
tion ho found the Navy had canceled the brief, and the Program Manager
then had to fight through the system to have the brief rescheduled.
A related problem is one of consistency. Both Congressional
personnel and the Program Managers verified that the story given Congress
52

is often Inconsistent, but they had different explanations for this
inconsistency. Congressional personnel consistently complained of
a Navy reluctant to pass on information. When the information was
forwarded, the inconsistent answers gave the impression of a Navy
not giving the complete truth. Program Managers said that frequently
people were, in fact, giving the complete information as they knew it,
but that they didn't have all the facts, and, therefore, the answers
seemed inconsistent. In non-DOD agencies, Congress often recognizes
that the facts may change and that the witness may not have the latest
information, especially if they know the witness and have decided they
can trust him. Congress does not presently have this same trust in the
Navy. This could be attributed to many causes, and staff members stated
that the short tours were a contributing factor.
3 . Characteristics of Program Managers
Congressional personnel gave mixed ratings of Program Managers.
They saw most Program Managers as being technically qualified and as
knowing their programs. However, they admitted that they have probably
viewed some as incompetent to manage a program when, in fact, the only
problem was that the person was not prepared to appear before Congress.
Congressional and DOD personnel stated that many military witnesses
appear before Congress with a self-assured attitude which v/as often per-
ceived as implying the feeling, "It's true because I say so, and I am a
Captain in the Navy or a Colonel in the Air Force." Program Managers
were often described as appearing to have this attitude, especially on
their first appearance. If this is true, one possible cause might be
the fact that just such self-assurance has helped these people to become
the success in the service that they are. There are strong indications
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from OLA and Congressional staffs that new
Program Managers frequently
come to Congress armed with technical knowledge
and an aura of righteous-
ness which irritates.
A related discrepancy between Congressional
desires and perceived
reality is that Congressional personnel fault the
Navy in general for
the apparent reluctance of its personnel to
admit mistakes. At least
some of this is probably due to the aforementioned
Navy view that
Congress's role is only to provide funding for military
programs. Mis-
takes and errors are seen as something to be corrected
in-house. Many
Navy personnel interviewed did not feel mistakes were
information which
Congress needed to provide funding for future expenditures.
Staff members
mentioned that it would help "clear the air" if a Program
Manager (or
any Navy witness) would just admit that a mistake had been made
rather
than covering it up.
Program Managers were described by Congressional personnel
as
being only partially aware of other programs. Normally
they were seen
as knowing those programs with which they are competing
for funding such
as a like missile or airplane. However, Congressional and
DOD inte -
viewees frequently complained that Program Managers often
failed t grasp
the effect of a reduction in a complementary program on their
program.
To a certain extent they recognized that this is due to the
demands on a
Program Manager's time-he can't possibly be aware of every detail
which
everybody thinks he should. On the other hand, Program Managers
hinted
that the impression that they are unaware of complementary
programs may
be due to the Navy's policy that a witness not talk about the
effects a
reduction in some other program may have upon his program. Navy
and
other DOD witnesses are expected to espouse the "party line" [Ref.
29,




of their department on such matters. One researcher says this is to
avoid allowing the Congress to see internal disagreement which they
might use to learn information about programs [Ref. 31, p. 182],
It must be pointed out, too, that the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921 which created the executive budget demands "party line" answers
unless Congressmen specifically ask for the witness's own viewpoints.
There is a prescribed procedure which all Congressmen and staffs are
aware of, which allows witnesses to give their private views [Ref. 30].
Some Congressmen complain, however, that they feel they don't see
witnesses with truly dissenting views [Ref. 28].
The foregoing were some of the reasons given for general distrust
of Program Managers by the Congress and staff. Other factors volunteered
which interviewees admitted might have little to do with an individual
Program Manager but still affect his program: Past experience with cost
growth in Navy programs, general distrust of the military as a result of
Vietnam, and disagreement with the overall objectives of the military.
As mentioned in the previous section, another reason given for a lack of
trust in the Program Manager comes from not knowing the Program Manager
well, and the feeling that he can't know his program thoroughly. Many
complained that Program Managers who are in their jobs for three years
or less don't gain sufficient knowledge to understand all the problems
involved until it is almost time to leave for a new job. Program Managers
In a hearing witnessed by the authors [Ref. 32], Senator
Proxmire voiced the complaint that when dissenting witnesses were
allowed before Congress, they were often given instructions not
to talk about those items of most interest to Congress and that if
they did, their job might be in jeopardy.
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that were somehow able to build
this trust in spite of all these diffi-
culties were described as dynamic,
aggressive individuals who were able
to convince Congress that they
would, in fact, provide full and timely
Information.
4. Other Items
Many Congressional personnel interviewed
saw the Navy, and DOD
in general, as failing to settle their
problems in-house, bringing them
instead to the Congress for arbitration.
At least one cause for this
occurrence is a Congress which, in years past,
intentionally designed the
Joint Chiefs of Staff structure to
encourage the presentation of differing
views [Ref. 33]. The authors see a definite
contradiction in the two
trends in Congress: The one encouraging
the airing of differences
between and within the individual services,
and the other discouraging
these airings and complaining when the
differences are brought to Con-
gress for settlement.
This same contradiction may be seen within
the Navy. Most Naval
personnel interviewed felt that a united front
of jointly approved infor-
mation must be shown to Congress. However,
there were some (including a
few Program Managers) who felt that they could
obtain more dollars for
their program than was in the budget request
by presenting a good case to
Congress that contained new information.
12
In some cases the Navy as a
13
whole has used this tactic.
12
The authors witnessed one Program Manager-initiated
CongressionaJ
brief on a system which the Program Manager knew
would not be in the next
year's budget. The brief was an effort to spark
Congressional interest
in the program in hopes that Congress would insert
funding.
13
It must be pointed out that efforts by the Navy to
Increase the money
for given programs in FY 1973 were spectacularly
ineffective A study or
FY 1973 action for ship construction, procurement of
^rcraft and m s i les
other procurement, and RDT&E showed no increase over
budget requests in




There is a fact of Navy life discussed by
several Navy interviewees
which might be said to almost encourage differing
priorities being given
the Congress, thereby unintentionally creating
an image of a Navy asking
Congress to arbitrate disputes. Because of the
many tasks of the Navy,
tt has more programs and weapons systems
than any of the other services.
As has been discussed, each Program Manager,
or appropriations sponsor, is
primarily aware of the justification and analysis for his
program. He
will speak of the Navy's role in that light
when justifying his program
before Congress. If the justification for one program is
presented too
strongly, it could appear to negate the need for a
seemingly supplementary
program. Given the large numbers of programs, this
could happen quite
often.
The concept of having something to "give up" was, as
we mentioned,
espoused by DOD and non-DOD budgetary officials. They
felt that there
is an unspoken desire on the part of Congress for
there to be a gentle-
man's agreement that there be some padding in the budget
which is there
solely for cutting and trading. They stated, however,
that in the - *st,
when items were being considered for cuts, the Navy
generally has a :ed
as if each and every item were equally critical to the
national def nse.
A possible explanation for this appearance is that one
of the thougnts
behind the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
is that all
of the money requested is required to meet the perceived
threat and that
the budget represents the most cost-effective method of attaining
this
[Ref. 1]. If one adopts this line of reasoning alone, then
one has
nothing left in the budget to give up for the sake of ensuring
the happi-






reality is rented to the
Congressional desire that Program
Managers,
and others in the military
who worK with Congress,
regain in their oobs
for longer periods of
tine. In fact, Congressional
personnel in general
cr,t1cized the relatively
short tours of the Navy in
all billets that
interact with Congress. The
surface cause of this
discrepancy appears to
«-. n»rt of the Navy to have officers
in the Navy trained
be the desire on the pa
r n n
in a wide variety of areas.
5 Pxp^lems^tM^hjLNa^U^^
Sections IV. D. 1. through IV.
D. 4. listed discrepancies
between
the Congressional expectations
and reality, and listed some
suggested
caUses for each discrepancy.
There are, however, within the
Navy struc-
ture for dealing with Congress
some areas which were suggested
by various
interviewees as contributing to
the generally stated
dissatisfaction with
the perforce of Program Managers
before Congress. These poss lb
le
problems within the Navy's system
are brought together in this
Section.
They represent the authors'
synthesis of the viewpoints
expressed to us
by both Naval and Congressional
personnel.
I„ section IV. A., we
suggested that an astute Program
Manager
m i ght want to make
use of background information
about the committee
before which he was appearing in
order to tailor his presentation
to a /
particular audience. Such information
might include items like blO-
graphical data on the co«ttee and staff
members, description of
interest areas of individuals
involved, and even an intelligent
guess
as to what the committee or
staff was actually seeking
from the Program
Manager. If the Program Manager
is to get this information
within the
current Navy structure without




from o,A for the
Armed Services Coatees and
from NavCompLia for the
Locations Co^Utees. To be effective
in providing such ,nforma-
PP P
i ...i that thev should bo well
versed
t1on , OLA and NavCompLia
personnel Feel oy
tn the inner workings
of Congress. However,
thoy point out that hero
ts no requirement for
personnel assigned to OLA
or NavCompLia to have
h1stoHcal pledge of Concessional
actions, personalities, or
even
, nocture This ts not to
imply that the Individual.
the Congressional struct .
ftmng these Mllets do not
acquire son, of this
knowledge; they do,
llstHctly on their own initiative.
However, they helieve that
ti.e
, s ,ost while this






that it often takes years
for Congressional
knowl edge, coined with hard work,
to create trust in
the in ^dual
by the Congressional
participants. Such trust can
be a useful tool
,
often leading t0 warn1n9 s
fro, Congressional personnel
of impending
roubles or problem areas early
enough to avoid adversity.
The
(Congressional Committee Liaison
Branch) tour of duty is only
three
years. (NavCompLia appears
to do better on this
score, tailoring Us
tours more to the
effectiveness of the individual
in the Job.) The
but instead irritate the
Congressional participants, are
left in their
b111 et until rotation time
occurs. While it is true
that Congress can
have a person removed by
expressing its displeasure to
the appropriate
people, we were told by both
Naval and Congressional
personnel that ,t
usually .quires some extremely
infuriating action on the part
of an
indlvWual to lead to his removal.
the Navy to identify those
individuals that interact with
Congress who
irritate, but don't anger.
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A problem observed by
the authors wbich is
peculiar to
HavComPLU is the fact
that they do not summarize
briefings. rMs
"I s that each W
itness must appear before
Appropriations brief,,.,
f +u i-vnpq of questions that
mtle or no significant intelligence
of the types q
V e been as.ed of prior
witnesses. It was pointed
out to the authors
.
„ budgeting officer that one tactic used by
the Appropna.o
at tte beginning of the
year. If this is true,
pledge of the areas
c.irh a tactic appears to be
4-
-,i fnr later Navy witnesses. Sucn
^ u H ,
ration material for l i i
iwyj
_
j n * ma that we interviewed.
foreign to those military
personnel outs.de of OLA
Both Congress and Navy
Congressional Liaison personnel
noted
that the Navy a l l0ws
requests for Information
to be delayed excessively
thus prompting a second
or third request from
Congress. Upon f.nal
receipt of the reply,
interviewees complained that
the contents were
onen outdated and completely
innocuous. OP 90S is viewed
by others «
th. Navy system as allowing
some requests for
information to become
w in their zeal to pursue requests which a^e perce, ad
slowed down or losu n n
i y
by them to be more
important. This may help to
create the image men-
A part of OP 906's
responsibilities is to ensure
consistency of
formation flowing to Congress from
year to year, a requirement
which
demands either time to research
past documents or an
encycloped.
Pledge on the part of the person ensuring
consistency, coupled wUh
r, nr(S time for such research is
at a
exposure to past occurrences.
Since
tn Pr.ure there is a rapid review
of the material for
premium, one way o ens
n p
+ n hav/P knowledge of what transpired
in
consistency is for the reviewer
to ve
the past. However, OP




In this section we have discussed the discrepancies between
Congressional expectations and reality. We have also listed some of
the possible causes. In the following sections we will list some of
the effects of the discrepancies.
E. EFFECTS OF DISCREPANCIES
There are a number of effects from the various discrepancies discussed.
Some of the effects are those as viewed specifically by Congressional per-
sonnel while others are effects which were seen by higher DOD personnel
who could observe Navy-Congressional interactions in a semidetached man-
ner. Finally, some of the effects are ones which the authors observed as
a result of their research.
1 . Know Congress
The lack of information that Program Managers have on the true
workings of Congress frequently leads to the view by Program Managers
that all committees are the same and that their interests are the same;
therefore, preparations should be the same. Our research showed that
nothing could be further from the truth. Each of the four committees
discussed in this thesis has different members with varying interests
and biases. What is probably more important than their actual differ-
ences is how they perceive themselves. Each committee sees itself in a
different light, and they jealously guard their positions and what they
see as their special interests. The lack of recognition of this fact
by witnesses irritates and angers Congressmen. To illustrate this,
one story was related to the authors of a Navy witness who complained, on
being asked a question by the HAC, that he had already answered that
question for the SASC the previous week. He was sternly lectured by the
visibly angered Chairman that he had better learn that what had been said
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to that "other" committee was of absolutely no interest to this commit-
tee and would he please answer the question.
DOD and Navy civilian personnel suggested that the failure of
Program Managers to study the background of Congressmen and staffs before
briefs and hearings often resulted in highly technical presentations.
Congressmen and their staffs said that they sometimes have difficulty
understanding such briefs and have little interest in them. They stated
that they feel the Program Manager involved in such a brief has either
unknowingly wasted their time or that he is trying to hide problem areas
with technical facts. In either case the Program Manager has unneces-
sarily irritated the Congressional personnel involved. Often this leads
14
to extra briefs/hearings being scheduled.
The lack of recognition of the importance of the committee staff
members to the Congressional system had several effects: Staff members
felt Program Managers were frequently not prepared to give the proper
information at a staff brief, either because they weren't given the areas
of staff member interests or because they felt it was unimportant. Some
Program Managers were seen by the staff as ignoring their requests for
information even though the problem may be due to the lengthy time period
required to process information through the liaison network. We were
told that sometimes Program Managers gave information directly to Congress-
men rather than staff members in the apparent belief that staff members
were not capable of properly handling some sensitive information. This
all leads to the feeling on the part of staff members that their importance
14
Staff members related that they often have had to reschedule
Congressional briefs, and occasionally hearings, because witnesses
were unprepared, unwilling, or unable to give the information needed
in an understandable and usable form.
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is being threatened. This, in turn, leads to their being extremely
15
irritated with the individual Program Manager. Since staff members
admit that they prepare most of the questions for the committee hearings
and since they may write a considerable portion of the final bill and
report, it would seem that irritating staff members might affect pro-
grams in many ways.
Frequently, failure to listen to the signals and desires of
Congress is, to the Congressman, perhaps the most baffling failure that
a governmental agency can make. As mentioned before, Congress considers
itself one of the most important legislative bodies in the world. When
someone, or some agency, continually ignores their wishes, they feel
that their importance is being impugned. When a Navy Program Manager's
attention is directed to a problem area, Congressional personnel stated
that they expect some action to be taken. Frequently, they claim that
they ask what action has been taken on an item since the previous year,
only to find that, to all appearances, the previous advice, or signal,
was ignored. The net effect as related by staff members is, at best a
loss of confidence in the Program Manager and quite possibly complete
rejection of the Program Manager and his program.
2. Be Honest and Provide Information
As has been mentioned, Congress sees Program Managers and the
Navy in general as withholding complete and total answers to questions.
As a result, Congressional personnel interviewed view those individuals
15
To give an example, one staff member revealed to the authors that
he had not been given sensitive information about a specific project in
time to avoid being caught uninformed by a Congressman. He mentioned
that a discussion with an ASN followed, and that he now received all
information on that project.
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who don't give complete answers as being unresponsive to Congress and
untrustworthy. Since they then suspect that information is being hid-
den s they feel their investigative efforts must be more thorough and,
as a result, Congress and their staffs look at more programs in greater
detail and consume more of a Program Manager's time.
In Section IV. D. 2. it was pointed out that Congressional per-
sonnel are resentful of large numbers of witnesses appearing and then not
speaking. They feel that the witness with the specialized knowledge they
want is bound to be present in a "sea of blue" but that he isn't allowed to
talk, or if permitted, he is constrained by the more senior witnesses pres-
ent. Staff members stated that this adds to the impression that facts are
being hidden and glossed over.
3. Characteristics of Program Managers
Where the characteristics of a Program Manager do not correspond
to Congressional expectations, there is a loss of faith in that individual.
(In general, the Program Manager concept itself is strongly approved by
Congress as it does place a visible individual in charge of a program.)
According to Appropriations staff members, such a loss of faith in a
specific Program Manager can lead to his program being investigated in
greater depth to see if the program can survive in spite of the Program
Manager. They stated that if Congress is not firmly convinced of the need
Staff members had almost universal criteria for the selection of
programs to be investigated: Large dollar programs, new programs, those
which have been highlighted in the news and sparked controversy, programs
which are in the area of interest and expertise of individual committee
members, programs which have significant changes, and those of interest to
the individual staff member due to some personal knowledge.
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for the program, or of its ability to survive a poor Program Manager, they
may cut the program significantly due to this loss of trust in the Program
Manager.
4. Other Items
As has been pointed out, the Navy tries to present a common front
to the Congress. Two divergent views were expressed to the authors about
the effects of internal problems and arguments being brought by individu-
als to Congress for solution. If an individual Congressman or staff member
is given a cause which is counter to the current administration's position'
and which he can successfully promote, it may make him feel important and
grateful to the individual, or group, who provided the information. In
general, however, individual campaigns for programs were described by Con-
gressional personnel and DOD civilian personnel as creating unwanted and
unneeded tensions in Congress. This is seen by the members as especially
undesirable when such tensions are created in the MAC. [Ref. 35]. When
an individual Program Manager can be credited with creating such tension,
he may have also created a pool of resentment which may overflow in the
action of a committee reviewing his program at a later date.
The shortness of Program Manager's tours was consistently men-
tioned as contributing, to the fact that no lasting trust of Program Managers
Many people in the Navy expressed to the authors the idea that the
only reason Congressmen and staff members desired information about pro-
grams was to enable them to find a "cause" they could fight for, or against,
successfully and, in the process, make a name for themselves. It should be
noted that if a Congressman supports a cause and is made to look bad, then
he probably will not trust that individual, or group, again.
I o
An indication of the rarity of HAC members successfully dissenting
with the committee in public can be seen in the reaction to Representative Rob-
ert Sikes' (D-Fla.) successful attempt to have monies for hiring civilians to
do KP put in the House Appropriations Bill for FY 1973. These monies had been
previously cut by the committee. Several people interviewed were surprised
that Rep. Sikes had been successful and viewed it as a sign of decreasing
power of the HAC.
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is built up by Congress. Although many Program Managers can convince
Congressmen and Congressional staffs of their personal trustworthiness,
this was described as normally taking a year or more. Congress must
have time to assess the individual, to observe how he prepares for them
and how he responds to them. Each Program Manager must "sell" himself
19
to Congress and build his own trust.
The ultimate trust that can be placed in a Program Manager can
be seen in the case of Admiral Rickover; Congress has such total faith
in him that they refuse to let the Navy retire him.
5. Net Effect
The ultimate effect of these irritations and the loss of trust
of Program Managers was repeatedly described as a general distrust of
the Navy and its programs. This is not to say that such distrust of the
Navy is created by Program Managers alone; many others in the Navy v/ere
mentioned as contributing to this situation. Congressional personnel
and high-ranking DOD personnel [Ref. 36] state that the Navy currentl.
has the poorest reputation before Congress of any of the DOD componen 5.
A lack of trust is seen as creating an atmosphere in which Congressic ,al
personnel are overly suspicious of Navy Program Managers. This is viewed
by many of the staff members interviewed as the real reason for cuts in
funding for programs, stretch-out of programs, and, in a few cases, the
19
Although at least one Program Manager thought that the trust the
Congress seemed to have in him would transfer to his relief, the authors'
impression is that Congressmen and staff members place the trust in an




outright cancellation of programs. It is also of interest that
many Congressional personnel stated that a poor presentation by the
Program Manager could cause the committee to kill or seriously hurt
his program. This is especially true in the case of a new program
with which Congress had little familiarity and where they must depend
21
on the initial briefs for impressions and facts.
20
The general explicit reasons which were given by Congressional
personnel for cuts in funding for programs were that they weren't
needed, there was waste in the program, the program conflicted with
some other program or was fulfilling a need which had already been
sufficiently met. However, many underlying reasons (which the authors
suggest may be the real reasons) were specifically mentioned, includ-
ing punitive cuts for not listening to Congress, cuts made because of
the lack of faith in a specific Program Manager or cuts made because a
Program Manager irritated the Congress. It must be noted that punitive
cuts were made within the specific programs which Congress wanted to
punish, although Congressional personnel sometimes admitted to wanting
to punish the entire Navy system because of the accumulation of irritat-
ing items.
21
The authors were told by a HAC staff member of a specific new
program which the HAC killed one year because the brief seemed to indi-
cate that little real thought had gone into the program. On later
investigation, they found that the program was, in fact, well managed
but had been presented poorly. As a result, the committee was prepared
to refund the program in conference if it were funded in the Senate ver-
sion. However, the Navy failed to reclama and thus a program was lost




The authors feel that the questions which were posed at the
beginning of this thesis have either been answered fully, or in such
a manner that other researchers will have some initial findings to
guide them.
First and foremost, there are extensive Navy Program Manager-
Congressional interactions', far more than any one individual interviewed
knew, or at least was willing to admit to us. Interactions run the
gamut from a Program Manager who occasionally answers a written question
for a Congressman or his staff to the Program Manager who briefs commit-
tee staff members and Congressmen frequently and testifies before the
House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees several
times a year. The frequency and level of interactions depend upon a
number of factors including the size and value of the program, its stage
of development, the amount of adverse press coverage, the special inter-
ests of Congressmen and staff members, and the apparent administration of
the project including the Congressional assessment of the Program Manager.
The number of these interactions appears to be increasing, perhaps as a
result of the increased stature of the Navy Program Managers. Also, there
are indications that Congress desires to become more involved in the man-
agerial and decision-making process of weapons acquisition, possibly




This is especially true of the SASC, which appears to desire to
become very involved in TACAIR, and of the HASC which appears to be
building a great interest and expertise in Navy shipbuilding.
68

There exists a formal organization to convey facts and informa-
tion between the Navy Program Managers and Congress. This organization
consists of NavCompLia (for the Appropriations Committees) and OLA
(for all other committees) as the direct contact points with Congress.
From these two offices, contacts are made through OP-906 to the Legis-
lative Liaison Offices of the Systems Commands and then to the Program
Managers. (The Legislative Liaison offices are often excluded from
this process.) This organization is intended to convey information for
the entire Navy, not just for Program Managers. The OLA portion of the
organization is also intended to gather intelligence information, such
as Congressional trends, desires, and personalities; but NavCompLia does
not perform the same functions. Due to historical and personality
reasons, most of this information is not being used by, or offered to,
Program Managers. The system is layered with many checks and balances,
and information takes time to pass from the Program Manager to the
Congress; we were told by Congressional personnel that upon arrival it
is so sanitized that it appears virtually meaningless to the Congressr n
or his staff. Thus, it appears that a system which is suppored to en: jre
timely flow of information plus correct and cordial relations with Cc gress
actually might be hindering both efforts where program Managers are in-
volved.
Program Managers, as a group, are seen by Congressional personnel
as having a pcor understanding of the mechanizations and personalities
of Congress. Our research indicated that this view was largely correct.
The authors feel that Program Managers are not given adequate infor-
mation for dealing with Congress, often because they are unaware that it is
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needed or that dealing with Congress involves a different type of
"politics" than does dealing with the DOD-Navy hierarchy. In addi-
tion, our research shows that many Program Managers have little time
to devote to events they see as incidental to the management of their
program, such as preparing for Congressional appearances, and most
appear to rely instead on superior technical knowledge of their program
and their standard brief.
We found some Program Managers who were exceptions to the above
remarks; who feel it is important to guide their program through the
Congressional maze, and who spend considerable time preparing for
Congress. In addition to managing their programs, they research the
backgrounds and interests of Congressmen and staff members, they read
past hearings, and they learn of the relationships and importance of
the different committees and their staffs. Some, who have fast-moving,
trouble-plagued programs, avoid the lengthy sanitizing formal information
passing process and pass information to Congress by other means. How-
ever, this is the exception rather than the rule.
Conclusions on the effects of Program Manager-Congressional
interactions can only be stated as possible conclusions for which there
is some degree of evidence. With this reservation in mind, it appears
that the Program Manager-Congressional interactions, as seen by Congress,
are generally poor. Program Managers do not appear before committees
and staffs as often as desired by Congress because the Navy frequently
sends other people to discuss the program. When Program Managers do
appear, we were told by Congressional personnel that they frequently do
not have the information actually desired. One interviewee suggested that
Program Managers are uncertain what Congress wants to know and in what
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manner they want the information to be presented, so they tel 1 Congress
what the Navy wants Congress to know, and in a manner which is most
comfortable to the Program Manager—a highly technical one. The lack
of proper preparation for briefs, and occasionally for testimony, has
in the past, led to cuts in programs, stretching-out of programs, and
increased investigation (which is often viewed as meddling) into pro-
grams. (See Section IV. E. 5.) The Navy in general is viewed by
Congressional personnel and DOD civilians as having a poor "track record"
before Congress.
It must be stated that, in spite of the ill will that this research
has discovered, the Navy continues to receive more funding for procure-
ment than any of the other services. The authors hypothesize, however,
that this is due largely to two causes: According to Congressional
personnel the history of Navy-Congressional relations prior to the mid-
1960 1 s is generally good. It would appear entirely possible that the
Navy is currently drawing on this bank of goodwill, and is being protected
by a few senior friends in the Congress. This is certainly a potential
topic for further research. Secondly, authorizations and appropriations
reports show that Congress still perceives a threat which must be met and
in many cases the Navy is seen as the best way to meet the threat. It
should be noted, however, that in the possible neo-isolation which may
occur following Vietnam, the threat may not seem so urgent to Congress.
Congressional action on the Navy defense budget in the next few years will
indicate the validity of this observation.
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V I . RECOjf^MENDATIONS
It is the contention of the authors that Mavy
Program Manager-
Congressional interactions can be improved. In that
vein, recommen-
dations are submitted, both general and specific.
Though they are
tentative, we feel they provide a basis for study
and discussion.
Some of the recommendations are for the Navy as a
whole and are
designed to affect overall Navy-Congressional
interactions, while
others apply specifically to Program Managers. As
stated in the
introduction, the recommendations and the body of the
thesis are not
viewed by the authors as providing the ultimate
answer to Congressional
relations. Rather, they are an effort to highlight
some of the problems
and to suggest a first stage in an iterative process
of searching for
solutions.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NAVY
A specific suggestion to promote better
Navy-Congressional
relationships is the streamlining of the OLA-NavCompLia-OP 906
system.
We would not recommend', as others have, combining OLA
and NavCompLia;
we feel that the separation is necessary if for no other
reason than
the expressed desire of the Appropriations Committees.
However, we
feel that there should be a greater interchange of
information and
intelligence between these two offices than there now is.
If NavCompLia
is to gather and disseminate information, which we feel
they should, they
need more people, aid, and assistance. It appears from
our research that
OLA needs a better system to gather, advertise the availability
of, and




brief. As recommended by the liaison
personnel themselves, the entire
liaison system needs to be streamlined to
promote more rapid flow of
requests and information. A suggestion
was that OP 906 be removed from
the system or assigned only the responsibility
of clearing information
and disseminating requests rather than the
multiple missions they now
have.
It was suggested by many that tours in
this type of duty should be
open-ended; if any individual performs well
in the system, consider the
possibility of a six- or seven-year tour, with
appropriate compensations,
in order that the trust and knowledge
developed can be utilized to good
advantage by the Navy. If, however, there is
evidence that an individual
is objectionable to, or irritates, Congressional
personnel, it was suggested
that he be removed to a billet where there
was no Congressional contact.
We recognize that there are factors other
than the desire to build and
make use of Congressional trust of an individual
which effect tour length.
At least one is the general policy of the Navy
to try to ensure that all
officers have a broad background of knowledge and
experience. We would
recommend that further research investigate and
compare the benefits
gained by a firm policy of short tours with those
which might be gained
by allowing longer tours in the liaison system.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROGRAM MANAGER
SYSTEM
Recognizing that Program Managers have different
styles as well as
varying contacts with Congress, we realize that there
can be no textbook
solutions to the problems. Nevertheless, there are
certain recommendations
which our research shows should apply to all who have
contact with Con-
gressional committees and their staffs.
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Perhaps the most important recommendation
is that the Program
Manager be made fully aware of the
importance of Congressional com-
mittee staff members to the overall
system. Some Program Managers
are often reluctant to provide information
to personnel they may see
as underlings. Past history shows
that staff members can indeed cut
programs if they are not fully satisfied.
Some senior Naval officers
may rightfully feel that they should
not work on a staff level. How-
ever, our research shows that staff
members feel they must at least
be kept informed of the information being
passed to Congressmen so
that the staff members don't find themselves
surprised by the Congress-
men.
It would appear important that a Program
Manager recognize that
preparation for Congressional hearings and
briefings is not exactly
the same as the preparation for any other
briefings. We would recommend
he study the background and interests of
all the people before whom he
is going to appear and, in his preparations,
slant the presentation
toward the interests of the particular
Congressional audience. Some of
our interviewees pointed out that a Program
Manager should be aware of
the differences in committees, of which ones
have closed hearings, which
are open, and what that means to him.
Further, it would be helpful to a
Program Manager to know why he is appearing-is it
to make a record, to
provide information, or to be a public target
for some Congressman? Some
of this information, as well as the types of
questions being asked and by
whom, may be available through OLA or NavCompLia.
If he is to ensure consistent answers from
year to year, it would help
the Program Manager to study tho previous hearings
and reports to ensure




which have occurred since the
past year. The maintenance and study
of files of statements that
have been officially made about his
pro-
gram would be beneficial, both for
the Program Manager's protection
and to ensure that his relief can
provide consistent, correct answers.
While we have made an effort to
indicate that the Program Manager
should always be allowed to speak for
his program, we recognize that,
due to policy or sensitivity, Program
Managers will not always be
given the opportunity to speak. To
prevent someone speaking for his
program with improper knowledge, Program
Managers could keep appropriate
Navy and DOD personnel informed when
possible, in writing, of current
program status.
As has been recommended [Ref. 37],
longer tours for Program Managers
are appropriate. The Program Manager
would then not only be more knowl-
edgeable about his program, and in all
likelihood be better able to
manage it, but also, ho would have
time to cultivate and maintain the
trust of Congress. As with Congressional
Liaison billets, we recommend
that further study be made of the idea
that the Program Manager of e
sensitive, controversial program must be
able to relate nail with C< ,-
gross; and if he doesn't, be replaced as
quickly and surely as wool be
the case if he managed his program poorly.
Finally, we recommend that the Program
Manager give considerable
thought to the problems of information
dissemination to the Congress.
On the one hand, we have the weight of
the Presidential, DOD, and Navy
hierarchy which desires that minimal adverse
information be given to the
Congress. Backing this desire is the whole
concept of executive budget-
ing. To defy this desire may encourage
a disastrous curtailment of the
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Program Manager's career. On the
other hand, there is the Congres-
sional system which wants unsanitized
information to better enable
it to judge programs, needs, and Program
Managers. To not give this
information quickly and willingly, or
worse, to be caught in a half-
truth or evasion can lead to program
cuts or curtailment. There is
no easy solution to this problem,
and the only recommendation the
authors can make is that the Program
Manager thoroughly study the
consequences of his decision each time he is
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON PROGRAM MANAGER-CONGRESSIONAL
INTERACTIONS
Have vou testified or been required to prepare
to testify (includ-
ing acting as back-up witness) before a formal
hearing of any o1
The following Congressional committees or their
subcommittees?
If a subcommittee of the full committee,
name the subcommittee
YES NO Name of subcommittee
Senate Armed Services Committee (31) (19)
House Armed Services Committee 31 19
Senate Appropriations Committee 25 2b
House Appropriations Committee (24) [db)
If you answered "NO" to all four committees,
go to question 4.









Prior to testifying, do you feel it is most
beneficial to concentrate





Have vou oresented a briefing (as differentiated from
formal testimony
for a hearing) to any of the following committees,
their subcommittees,
or sane 2(s) o/the subcommittee? If a subcommittee or member
thereof, .indicate which subcommittee or individual.
YES NO Subcommittee or Member
Senate Armed Services Committee (27) (23)
House Armed Services Committee (18) (32) , —
Senate Appropriations Committee (13) (37) _ __




If you answered "NO" to all four committees, go to
question 7
*
Numbers in brackets are the total responses for each
question Note
that they do not always total fifty, the number of
responses received, as
many questions were not answered.
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5. Indicate the frequency of such a briefing.
Once ( 8 |
Annually (12)
Frequently (12)
fi Prior to presenting the brief, do you feel it is
most beneficial to






7 Have you had dealings, such as briefings,
responses to letters,
telephone conversations, etc., with the staff
members of any of
the following committees?
YES NO
Senate Armed Services Committee (32) (18)
House Armed Services Committee 29 2
Senate Appropriations Committee 19 31
House Appropriations Committee (22) (2°)
If "YES," indicate what form the dealings
were and approximately





8. Of the four committees discussed, do you feel it
is more ^port.nt






If "YES," which committee?
In recent years there have been complaints that
Congress does not
ook at programs or projects, but rather, looks at line items
How




Answers to this question were varied »™» «J«^* *J PSSllL





Line Item Program or Project
Senate Armed Services Committee (6) (29)
House Armed Services Committee ( 5) (30)
Senate Appropriations Committee (18) (14)
House Appropriations Committee (16) (16)
10. Do you feel the following committees (including their staffs) look at,
and judge, your program in isolation or in comparison to other programs
of a similar nature?
Isolation Comparison
Senate Armed Services Committee ( 7) (26)
House Armed Services Committee (10) (22)
Senate Appropriations Committee ( 5) (25)
House Appropriations Committee ( 4) (27)
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